Since the city of San Francisco is in the State of California; and since Wong Kim Ark's parents were resident aliens and not transient aliens, then Wong Kim Ark's birth in San Francisco made him a citizen of the State of California and not a citizen of the United States.
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court held that a citizen of a State was -2 -separate and distinct from a citizen of the United States:
"Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respective are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment." Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873) .
http://books.google.com/books?id=DkgFAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA74#v=onepage&q&f=false
In addition: "In the Slaughterhouse cases, 16 Wall. 36, the subject of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of a particular State, was treated by Mr. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court. He stated . . . that it was only privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States that were placed by the [Fourteenth] amendment under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State, whatever they might be, were not intended to have any additional protection by the paragraph in question, but they must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested." Maxwell v. Dow: 176 U.S. 581, at 587 (1900).
http://books.google.com/books?id=8toGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA587#v=onepage&q&f=false And: ". . . It is, then, to the Fourteenth Amendment that the advocates of the congressional act must resort to find authority for its enactment, and to the first section of that amendment, which is as follows: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
In the first clause of this section, declaring who are citizens of the United States, there is nothing which touches the subject under consideration. The second clause, declaring that 'no State shall make or enforce any law which will abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' is limited, according to So now there is a citizen of a State and there is a citizen of the United States:
"We come to the contention that the citizenship of Edwards was not averred in the complaint or shown by the record, and hence jurisdiction did not appear.
In answering the question, whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the controversy, we must put ourselves in the place of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and decide the question with reference to the transcript of record in that court.
Had the transcript shown nothing more as to the status of Edwards than the averment of the complaint that he was a 'resident of As this is an action at law, we are bound to assume that the testimony of the plaintiff contained in the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, and recited to have been given on the trial, was preserved in a bill of exceptions, which formed part of the transcript of record filed in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Being a part of the record, and proper to be resorted to in settling a question of the character of that now under consideration, Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 648, we come to ascertain what is established by the uncontradicted evidence referred to.
In the first place, it shows that Edwards, prior to his employment on the New York Sun and the New Haven Palladium, was legally domiciled in the State of Delaware. Next, it demonstrates that he had no intention to abandon such domicil, for he testified under oath as follows: 'One of the reasons I left the New Haven Palladium was, it was too far away from home. I lived in Delaware, and I had to go back and forth. My family are over in Delaware. ' Now, it A citizen of the State of California is recognized in the following cases from the Supreme Court of the United States: "Isaac J. Lewis, a citizen of Nevada, the appellee, on the 15th of January, 1881, brought suit against Harris Lewis, a citizen of California, for the dissolution of an alleged partnership between them, and a settlement of the partnership affairs." Shainwald v. Lewis: 108 U.S. 158, at 158 (1883).
http://books.google.com/books?id=zb0GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA158#v=onepage&q&f=false "This was a bill in equity, filed by Angelica Wakelee, a citizen of the State of California, against Davis, a citizen of New York, to enforce an estoppel, and enjoin the defendant from asserting, in defence of any suit which may be brought upon a certain judgment recovered by Henry P. Wakelee against Davis, in one of the state courts of California, that the debts upon which such judgment was obtained were not merged in such judgment, and from denying the validity of the judgment, as a debt against Davis, unaffected by his discharge in bankruptcy." Statement of the Case, Davis v. Wakelee: 156 U.S. 680, at 681 (1895). http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html "The language of the Fourteenth Amendment declaring two kinds of citizenship is discriminating. It is: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' While it thus establishes national citizenship from the mere circumstance of birth within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, birth within a state does not establish citizenship thereof. contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired." Elk v. Wilkins: 112 U.S. 94, at 101 thru 102 (1884).
http://books.google.com/books?id=rHEUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false "To be 'completely subject' to the political jurisdiction of the United States is to be in no respect or degree subject to the political jurisdiction of any other government." United States v. Wong Kim Ark: 169 U.S. 649, at (706), 725 (dissenting opinion of Justice Fuller, with whom concurred Justice Harlan) (1898).
http://books.google.com/books?id=4-sGAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA725#v=onepage&q&f=false
Each State of the Union has political jurisdiction also. Both before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment: "The first proposition on which counsel insist, in support of the demurrer is, that this court has no jurisdiction of the case, because it involves the consideration of questions purely political; that is to say, that the main question to be decided is the conflicting claims of the two States to the exercise of political jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of the two counties which are the subject of dispute. . . . . We consider, therefore, the established doctrine of this court to be, that it has jurisdiction of questions of boundary between two States of this Union, and that this jurisdiction is not defeated, because in deciding that question it becomes necessary to examine into and construe compacts or agreements between those States, or because the decree which the court may render, affects the territorial limits of the political jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States which are parties to the proceeding. These authorities do not control the present case. They relate to questions of boundary between independent nations, and have no application to a question of that character arising between the General Government and one of the States composing the Union, or between two States of the Union. By the Articles of Confederation, Congress was made 'the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences' then subsisting or which thereafter might arise 'between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other cause whatever;' the authority so conferred to be exercised by a special tribunal to be organized in the mode prescribed in those Articles, and its judgment to be final and conclusive. Art. 9. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution there existed, as this court said in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 723, 724 , controversies between eleven States, in respect to boundaries, which had continued from the first settlement of the colonies. The necessity for the creation of some tribunal for the settlement of these and like controversies that might arise, under the new government to be formed, must, therefore, have been perceived by the framers of the Constitution, and, consequently, among the controversies to which the judicial power of the United States was extended by the Constitution, we find those between two or more States. And that a controversy between two or more States, in respect to boundary, is one to which, under the Constitution, such judicial power extends, is no longer an open question in this court. And, there is the following:
"Section 1333 (a) (3) provides that 'adoption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom.' Petitioner argues that state-court jurisdiction over this personal injury case would contravene this provision. This argument again confuses the political jurisdiction of a State with its judicial jurisdiction." Gulf Offshore Company v. Mobil Oil Corporation: 453 U.S. 473, at 482 (1981) .
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18303575675978186938 Therefore, a person born in a State of the Union is not subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States, but rather, to the political jurisdiction of a particular State.
Political jurisdiction of the United States extends to only the District of Columbia, its territories and possessions, and federal enclaves with the several States of the Union: ". . . The Constitution provides that 'Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district, (not exceeding ten miles square,) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.' Art. 1, sec. 8.
The necessity of complete jurisdiction over the place which should be selected as the seat of government was obvious to the framers of the Constitution. Unless it were conferred the deliberations of Congress might in times of excitement be exposed to interruptions without adequate means of protection; its members, and the officers of the government, be subjected to insult and intimidation, and the public archives be in danger of destruction. The Federalist, in support of this clause in the Constitution, in addition to these reasons, urged that "a dependence of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the government for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other members of the confederacy." No. 43.
The necessity of supreme legislative authority over the seat of government was forcibly impressed upon the members of the constitutional convention by occurrences which took place near the close of the Revolutionary War. At that time, while Congress was in session in Philadelphia, it was surrounded and insulted by a body of mutineers of the Continental Army. In giving an account of this proceeding, Mr. Rawle, in his Treatise on the Constitution, says of the action of Congress: 'It applied to the executive authority of Pennsylvania for defence; but, under the illconceived constitution of the State at that time, the executive power was vested in a council, consisting of thirteen members, and they possessed or exhibited so little energy, and such apparent intimidation, that the Congress indignantly removed to New Jersey, whose inhabitants welcomed it with promises of defending it. It remained for some time at Princeton without being again insulted, till, for the sake of greater convenience, it adjourned to Annapolis. The general dissatisfaction with the proceedings of the executive authority of Pennsylvania, and the degrading spectacle of a fugitive Congress, suggested the remedial provisions now under consideration.' Rawle, Constitution of the United States, 113. Of this proceeding Mr. Justice Story remarks: "If such a lesson could have been lost upon the people, it would have been as humiliating to their intelligence as it would have been offensive to their honor." 2 Story Constitution, § 1219.
Upon the second part of the clause in question, giving power to 'exercise like authority,' that is, of exclusive legislation 'over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings,' the Federalist observes that the necessity of this authority is not less evident. 'The public money expended on such places,' it adds, 'and the public property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the entire Union may depend to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every such establishment.' 'The power,' says Mr. Justice Story, repeating the substance of Mr. Madison's language, 'is wholly unexceptionable, since it can only be exercised at the will of the State, and therefore it is placed beyond all reasonable scruple.' This power of exclusive legislation is to be exercised, as thus seen, over places purchased, by consent of the Legislatures of the States in which they are situated, for the specific purposes enumerated. It would seem to have been the opinion of the framers of the Constitution that, without the consent of the States, the new government would not be able to acquire lands within them; and therefore it was provided that when it might require such lands for the erection of forts and other buildings for the defence of the country, or the discharge of other duties devolving upon it, and the consent of the States in which they were situated was obtained for their acquisition, such consent should carry with it political dominion and legislative authority over them. Purchase with such consent was the only mode then thought of for the acquisition by the general government of title to lands in the States. Since the adoption of the Constitution this view has not generally prevailed. Such consent has not always been obtained, nor supposed necessary, for the purchase by the general government of lands within the States. If any doubt has ever existed as to its power thus to acquire lands within the States, it has not had sufficient strength to create any effective dissent from the general opinion. The consent of the States to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named is, however, essential, under the Constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the States equally with the property of private individuals." Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe: 114 U.S. 525, at 528 thru 531 (1885).
http://books.google.com/books?id=jN8GAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA528#v=onepage&q&f=false ". . . This brings us to the question whether Congress has power to exercise 'exclusive legislation' over these enclaves within the meaning of Art. I, § 8. cl. 17, of the Constitution, which reads in relevant part: 'The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever' over the District of Columbia and 'to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.'
The power of Congress over federal enclaves that come within the scope of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, is obviously the same as the power of Congress over the District of Columbia. The cases make clear that the grant of 'exclusive' legislative power to Congress over enclaves that meet the requirements of Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, by its own weight, bars state regulation without specific congressional action. The question was squarely presented in Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, which involved, as does the present litigation, California's Act and an attempt to fix the prices at which milk could be sold at Moffett Field. We held that 'sales consummated within the enclave cannot be regulated' by California because of the constitutional grant of 'exclusive legislation' respecting lands purchased by the United States with the consent of the State (id., at 294), even though there was no conflicting federal Regulation.
